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Empirical studies document that resource reallocation across production units plays
an important role in accounting for aggregate productivity growth in the U.S. manufac-
turing. Distortions in ¯nancial market could hinder the reallocation process and hence
may adversely a®ect aggregate productivity growth. This paper studies the quanti-
tative impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate productivity through resource
reallocation across ¯rms with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. A partial equilibrium
model calibrated to the U.S. manufacturing data shows that costly external ¯nance
causes ine±cient output reallocation from high productivity ¯rms to low productivity
¯rms and as a result leads to a 1 percent loss in aggregate TFP.
Key words: Costly external ¯nance; Reallocation; Output weighted aggregate
productivity
2Introduction
This paper studies the quantitative impact of ¯nancial frictions on aggregate productivity in
a setting with heterogenous ¯rms. Recently there has been an increased interest in under-
standing the microeconomic dynamics of aggregate productivity growth. Corresponding to
this literature is a surge of empirical work that exploits establishment-level data to explore
the relationship between microeconomic productivity dynamics and aggregate productivity
growth. Representative work includes Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), Bartelsman and
Dhrymes (1998), Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), and etc. A common theme of these
studies is to decompose aggregate productivity growth into several parts to characterize the
contributions of within plant productivity growth and reallocation, where the latter includes
the contribution of reallocation among continuing establishments and the impact of entry
and exit 1. Despite that their ¯ndings vary with the speci¯c data sets and decomposition
methodologies used, a uniform ¯nding in these studies is an important role of reallocation
in accounting for aggregate productivity growth in the U.S. manufacturing. For instance,
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) document that reallocation accounts for about half of
overall multifactor productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing for the period 1977 to 1987.
Distortions in product, labor, credit market and policies can all slow aggregate produc-
tivity growth by hindering the reallocation process among heterogenous producers. However,
works that explain and quantify these impacts remain little. Restuccia and Rogerson (2003)
explores the quantitative impacts of policy distortions on aggregate productivity in a sta-
tionary equilibrium with heterogeneous plants. They show that policy distortions that create
heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual producers lead to misallocation of resources
across heterogeneous plants, and as a result can lead to sizable decreases in output and
measured TFP. This paper is along the same line of Restuccia and Rogerson (2003), while
the distortion we focus on is ¯nancial frictions.
Frictions in ¯nancial market constrain a ¯rm's ability to ¯nance pro¯table investment
opportunities, and as a result, may lead to misallocation of resources among heterogenous
producers and therefore hamper the growth of aggregate productivity. This paper formulates
a simple partial equilibrium model to quantitatively assess this adverse e®ect. We abstract
from modeling the microfoundations of ¯nancial frictions. Instead, ¯nancial market imper-
fections are summarized into a simple external ¯nance cost function capturing the basic idea
that external funds are more costly than internal funds if ¯nancial imperfections present (see
Fazzari, Hubard and Peterson (1988)). Then the costly external ¯nance function is incorpo-
rated into a standard capital accumulation problem of a ¯rm with idiosyncratic productivity
shocks.
Firm entry and exit are excluded from the baseline model. That is, we focus on the
impact of external ¯nance on reallocation among continuing establishments. This simpli¯-
cation is taken based on two considerations. First, the simpli¯cation is not a big deviation
from the Compustat U.S. manufacturing data we use to calibrate the model, as the Com-
pustat ¯rms are relatively large and mature and do not exhibit a lot of entry and exit 2.
Like many studies on external ¯nance (see Whited (1992, 2005), Gomes (2001), and etc.),
we use Compustat data to calibrate the model since it provides detailed ¯nancial data such
as ¯rms' debt, equity issuance, interest expenses, and so on, which are crucial information
for our model, while a richer data set for the U.S. manufacturing like LRD lacks such in-
3formation. On average, the Compustat ¯rms in our sample account for 82% of the total
employment of U.S. manufacturing, so the data set provides a good representation of U.S.
manufacturing. Second, reallocation among continuing establishments is itself an important
contributor to productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing, as many empirical studies have
documented. Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) ¯nd that reallocation of output shares to
more productive plants within stayers accounts for nearly half of the TFP growth for the
1972-77 period and about one third of the rapid productivity growth in the 1980s. Foster,
Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) ¯nd that reallocation within continuing plants accounts for
26% of overall multifactor productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing for the 1977-87 pe-
riod. Therefore, examining how external ¯nance in°uences reallocation among continuing
establishments alone is important for us to understand the impact of external ¯nance on
aggregate productivity dynamics. But we do recognize the signi¯cant role entry and exit
may play as the other important component of reallocation, so in a later section we also give
a discussion on how the results of the baseline model may change if considering ¯rm entry
and exit.
The model is simulated to compute the stationary properties of the industry, which are
then compared with the properties of a stationary equilibrium with costless external ¯nance.
The results show that costly external ¯nance leads to a reallocation of output shares from
high-productivity ¯rms to low productivity ¯rms such that the output-weighted aggregate
TFP is 1 percent less than it would be if external ¯nance is costless. This is a signi¯cant loss
considering that aggregate TFP growth for the U.S. manufacturing has averaged less than 1
percent a year in the 1970s and 1980s (according to the NBER Manufacturing Productivity
Database, see Bartelsman and Gray (1996)). In a discussion we show that this quantitative
result does not hinge on the partial equilibrium analysis adopted and considering ¯rm entry
and exit is unlikely to change its magnitude signi¯cantly. A comparative static analysis
shows that the adverse impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate productivity increases
with the return to scale, the persistence of productivity shocks, the variability of productivity
across ¯rms, and external ¯nance costs. Since the Compustat ¯rms in our data sample may
exhibit less diversity in ¯rm level productivities than a richer data set like LRD would suggest
and may face lower external ¯nance costs than an average manufacturing ¯rm would face,
our result may underestimate the quantitative impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate
productivity growth for the U.S. manufacturing. A re-calibration is desirable when a richer
data set incorporating ¯nance and performance information becomes available 3. However,
a discussion suggests that a re-calibration is not expected to change this quantitative result
dramatically.
This paper also gives interesting implications for the impact of ¯nancial market frictions
on output growth, which has been an important research issue. A majority of this litera-
ture discusses this issue within the framework of neoclassical growth models that abstract
from heterogeneity in production units. Not surprisingly, much of the literature has been
concerned with understanding the role of aggregate accumulation and how aggregate accu-
mulation is a®ected by ¯nancial market frictions. However, the empirical evidence shows
that it is not only the level of factor accumulation that matters for aggregate output but
how these factors are allocated across heterogenous production units. In our model, costly
external ¯nance decreases aggregate output through two channels. One is the traditional
channel{capital accumulation. Costs associated with external ¯nance increase the aggregate
4relative price of capital, and as a result decrease aggregate investment and lower aggregate
capital accumulation. The other channel is through resource reallocation across heteroge-
nous ¯rms which results in a lower aggregate productivity. Our results show that with costly
external ¯nance, the reallocation leads to 0.3 percent loss in aggregate output, which is about
a third of its impact on aggregate productivity. The small magnitude of this e®ect may sug-
gest that for the U.S. economy, the traditional neoclassical model is not a bad framework for
characterizing the long run consequences of ¯nancial frictions on aggregate output despite
that it ignores the e®ect through resource reallocation across heterogenous production units.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To help formulate the model and under-
stand the results, Section 1 reviews a popular measurement of aggregate productivity and a
decomposition methodology of aggregate productivity growth widely adopted by the empir-
ical studies. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 details the calibration and simulation
methods. Section 4 describes the results from the baseline model. Section 5 discusses the
robustness of the main quantitative result to several variations of the analysis. And Section
6 concludes.
1 Measurement of Aggregate Productivity and Decom-
position of Aggregate Productivity Growth
A lot of empirical studies use the sum of output (or employment) weighted ¯rm/plant level
TFP (or labor productivity) to measure the aggregate productivity of an industry. According
to Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), the de¯nition of aggregate productivity is as follows.
Suppose the production function for plant i in period t is
Qit = F(Kit;Lit;Mit);
where K, L and M are capital, labor and intermediate inputs, respectively. The plant level
TFP is de¯ned as
lnTFPit = lnQit ¡ ®KlnKit ¡ ®LlnLit ¡ ®MlnMit;
where ®K, ®L and ®M are return to scale factors for capital, labor and intermediate inputs






where µit is the output share of the ith plant in industry output.
The industry productivity growth is typically decomposed into several parts characteriz-
ing the relative contributions of the stayers, the entrants and the exits. According to Baily,
Hulten and Campbell (1992), the change in industry productivity between t ¡ ¿ and t can

















5The ¯rst term re°ects the contribution of within plant productivity growth to aggregate
productivity growth. The last two terms re°ect the contribution of reallocation, where the
second term re°ects the contribution of reallocation of shares within continuing plants, and
the last term re°ects the contribution of net entry.
In this paper, we formulate a version of the growth model in which capital accumulation
and production is carried out by heterogenous ¯rms with idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
We compare the steady state output-weighted aggregate productivity in two cases: external
¯nance is costly and costless. In other words, we consider the change in aggregate produc-
tivity from t¡¿ to t, imagining that in period t¡¿ the industry is in the steady state with
costless external ¯nance, while in period t the industry is in the steady state with costly
external ¯nance. It is shown that in the decomposition equation (1), the ¯rst term is zero,
since the two periods have exactly the same productivity distribution. The third term is also
zero since ¯rm entry and exit is excluded in the model. Therefore the change in aggregate
productivity is completely characterized by the second term{reallocation of output shares
across heterogenous ¯rms due to costly external ¯nance.
2 The Model
The analysis is of partial equilibrium type, in that it focuses on a single ¯rm's dynamic
capital accumulation problem. When assessing the aggregate implications of costly external
¯nance, a large number of such ¯rms are considered. A discussion in Section 5 shows that a
more complex general equilibrium analysis would not change the main results.
The ¯rm is in¯nitely lived. That is, we exclude ¯rm entry and exit from the analysis. In
a later section, we discuss how the results would change if considering ¯rm entry and exit.




t ; ® < 1:
Here, kt is the ¯rm's capital stock at the beginning of period t. Capital depreciates at rate ±
and must be decided one period in advance. The relative price of capital good is p. zt is the
¯rm's idiosyncratic total factor productivity (TFP) shock. It is assumed to follow a AR(1)
process given by
zt+1 = ½zt + "t+1;
where " follows a truncated normal distribution with zero mean, standard deviation of ¾
and ¯nite support [¡10¾;10¾]. Note that the ¯rm's TFP in period t is ezt, according to the
de¯nition in Section 1.
The ¯rm can ¯nance its investment in capital by internal funds or borrowing from the
¯nancial market. As in Gomes (2001) and Whited (2004), we assume that ¯nancial market
imperfections exist and are summarized with a simple external ¯nance cost function that
takes the linear form given by
¸ = ¸0 + ¸1 £ amount of external funds:
Equivalently, there is a ¯xed cost ¸0 and per unit cost ¸1 associated with external ¯nance.
This speci¯cation is intended to capture a variety of costs of going to ¯nancial market to raise
6capital, which would include the ¯xed and variable costs of public stock o®erings, costs of
monitoring the ¯rm and the discounted present value of any premia associated with external
debt and equity ¯nance. Clearly the ¯rm will only choose to use external ¯nance when it
exhausts internal funds and current investment opportunities justify the additional cost of
external funds.
The ¯rm's problem is to choose its capital stock to maximizes its expected discounted
sum of future net cash °ow, taking the price of capital good p as given. It has the following
recursive formulation.






0) ¡ ¼(k;z);0g + ¯Ez0jzV (k
0;z
0); (2)
where i(k;k0) = k0 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)k, and If¢g is an indicator function. The right-hand side of (2)
speci¯es the decisions the ¯rm has to make. The ¯rst four terms re°ect the current net cash
°ow: pro¯ts minus investment spending and ¯nancing costs. The last term is the expected
continuation value.
Notice that in the model ¯rms can only save through real assets (capital). We abstract
from ¯rm savings in cash holding or other ¯nancial assets. Allowing for these other forms
of savings would give ¯rms more means of transferring funds across periods, and as a result
may alleviate ¯rms' ¯nancing constraints due to costly external ¯nance. However, this
simpli¯cation should not be quantitatively signi¯cant for the question we aim to address
because in the data a majority of investing funds is used for capital expenditure. In the data
sample we use to calibrate the model, capital expenditure accounts for 86 percent of total
investing funds, while funds used for cash holdings and short-term ¯nancial assets are only
7 percent. Also, in our calibration, we restrict investment to be capital expenditure only.
Applying standard arguments of dynamic programming, one can show that a unique
solution to this problem exists and establish some useful properties of the value function.
Proposition 1 For a given p, there is a unique function V (k;z) that satis¯es (1); V (k;z)
is continuous and increasing in both k and z, and concave in k.
Associated with this solution there is a decision rule concerning capital accumulation,
denoted by k0(k;z). If external ¯nance is costless (¸0 = ¸1 = 0), k0(k;z) would be a function
of current productivity shock z only, i.e., it is independent of current capital stock. Costly
external ¯nance introduces dependence of k0 on k. The following proposition characterizes
the decision rule k0(k;z).




(i) For k < k1(z), the ¯rm resorts to external ¯nance and k0(k;z) = k0
e(z);
(ii) For k1(z) · k · k2(z), the ¯rm's investment is constrained by its pro¯ts, i.e.,k0(k;z) =
(1 ¡ ±)k +
¼(k;z)
p ;
(iii) For k > k2(z), the ¯rm's investment achieves its unconstrained level, i.e., k0(k;z) =
k0
u(z).
PROOF: See Appendix A.2.
7Proposition 2 states that for a given current productivity level, if the ¯rm's current capital
stock is relatively small, using external ¯nance is pro¯table. But since the pro¯t function
exhibits decreasing return to scale, when the ¯rm's capital stock passes some level (k1(z)),
current investment opportunities would not justify the additional cost of external ¯nance
and hence the ¯rm's investment is constrained by its operating pro¯t. If the ¯rm's capital
stock is big enough (greater than k2(z)) such that it could generate enough cash °ow to
¯nance desired level of investment, the ¯rm's investment is no longer ¯nancially constrained.
Figure 1 plots the policy function k0(k;z) for a low level of current productivity z and
a high level of z. The ¯gure is based on the baseline parameterization to be described in
next section. In both plots, the solid line corresponds to the case of costly external ¯nance,
and the dashed line corresponds to costless external ¯nance. Note that with costly external
¯nance, k0 depends on k in the way described in Proposition 2. The ¯gure also shows that
with costly external ¯nance k0(k;z) may be discontinuous at k1(z) (For characterization of
k1(z), see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.2). This is due to the nonlinearity
introduced by a ¯xed external ¯nance cost.
A comparison of the two plots shows that the constrained region with a high productivity
is larger than the constrained region with a low productivity (both k1(z) and k2(z) are larger
with a higher z), implying that high productivity ¯rms are more seriously impacted by costly
external ¯nance. Another ¯nding is that the unconstrained level of k0 with costly external
¯nance (k0
u(z)) is bigger than the e±cient level corresponding to costless external ¯nance
(These two are equal only at the highest level of z), implying that with costly external ¯nance
¯rms have an incentive to over-accumulate capital when they are not ¯nancially constrained,
a behavior similar to \precautionary saving" by households subject to borrowing constraints.
This precautionary saving motive is stronger for lower productivity ¯rms as the gap between
the two unconstrained levels of k0 is larger with a lower productivity. In summary, Figure 1
implies that higher productivity ¯rms are more ¯nancially constrained and have less incentive
to over accumulate capital when they are able to do so. As a result, the adverse e®ect of
costly external ¯nance on capital accumulation is more severe for higher productivity ¯rms
than for lower productivity ¯rms. This property will help explain why the presence of costly
external ¯nance has an adverse e®ect on aggregate productivity, as will be clear in a later
section.
Proposition 2 implies that small ¯rms (with smaller capital stock) resorts to external
¯nance more often. This seems to contradict the commonly held belief that small ¯rms are
more ¯nancially constrained and rely on internal funds more heavily. We compute external
¯nance ratios by asset class for Compustat manufacturing ¯rms during the 1989-2003 period,
as reported in Table 1. A strong negative relationship is found between external ¯nance ratios
and the total assets of ¯rms. That is, smaller ¯rms have higher external ¯nance ratios than
larger ¯rms 5. Since Compustat ¯rms are mainly large mature ¯rms, it's not clear whether
this relationship holds for all manufacturing ¯rms. However, this ¯nding suggests that the
commonly held belief may not hold uniformly in the data.
(Insert Table 1 here)
83 Calibration and Simulation
To execute a quantitative analysis, we need to set values for parameters of the model, in-
cluding the relative price of capital good, p, the discount factor, ¯, the depreciation rate of
capital, ±, the return to scale, ®, the parameters describing the productivity shock, ½ and
¾, and parameters in the external ¯nance cost function, ¸0 and ¸1. The data we use to
estimate or calibrate the parameters is taken from the Compustat North American industry
annual ¯le. We only consider ¯rms in the manufacturing sector (with SIC codes between
2000 and 3999) during the period of 1989 to 2003. This time period is chosen since there
are substantial changes in the reporting and accounting methods since 1988. Observations
with missing data are deleted from the sample. Similar to Whited (1992) and Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995), we exclude observations with large changes in the book value of capital
stock, considering that they may indicate expansions or contractions of ¯rms at margins
other than capital expenditure (See Appendix A.1.1 for details). Finally we end up with an
unbalanced panel of ¯rms from 1989 to 2003 with between 2210 and 3265 observations per
year. Appendix A.1.2 gives a detailed description of the variables in this data sample.
First, we normalize p to 1. Following Cooper and Ejarque (2001), we set ¯ to 0.95. The
external ¯nance cost function was estimated by Smith (1977) and Altinkilic and Hansen
(2000), both using data on costs associated with new equity issuance. Their estimates
for ¸1 are 0.028 and 0.0241 respectively. Since in the data external ¯nance mainly takes
the form of debt ¯nance rather than equity ¯nance 6, we re-estimate this parameter by a
panel regression of interest expenses of debt on debt issuance 7. It gives a similar result,
¸1 = 0:028. Since ¸0 is sensitive to units of measure, it is estimated together with ®, ±, ½
and ¾ to match ¯ve moments of the data. The ¯rst moment is the mean annual investment
rate de¯ned as the ratio of total investment to total capital stock, which is 0.17 for the
data sample. The second moment is the cross-sectional average investment rate, which is
0.22. The third moment is the cross-sectional standard deviation of investment rate, which
is 0.19. The fourth moment is the autocorrelation of investment rate, which is 0.21. In
constructing investment rates for each ¯rm at each year, the book values of the gross capital
stock are converted into its replacement values following the perpetual inventory method
described in Salinger and Summers (1983). Appendix A.1.3 gives a detailed description of
this procedure. The last moment is the fraction of total investment ¯nanced externally,
i.e. the ratio of external ¯nance used for investment to total investment. Compustat does
not have enough information to directly calculate this moment. But it can be reasonably
approximated by the ratio of total external ¯nance to total uses of funds, which is 0.072,
since in the data sample 86% of total uses of funds are for new capital purchase. These ¯ve
moments are selected for their informativeness about the underlying structural parameters
as well as their prominence in the literature.
To demonstrate that these ¯ve moments provide identi¯cation of the ¯ve parameters to
be estimated, Table 2 presents how their values change with respect to small changes in
each parameter. In the table, parameterization (1) is a benchmark parameterization, where
the parameters are set to values commonly used in the literature. In particular, the annual
depreciation rate ± is set to 10%; the return to scale parameter ® is set to 0.975, a value
close to the standard CRS assumption; parameters governing the productivity shocks ½ and
¾ are set to 0.95 and 0.01 respectively, values that are commonly used in the RBC literature;
9the ¯xed external ¯nance cost ¸0 is set to 1000, a positive but very small number relative
to the average amount of external ¯nance in equilibrium (which is about 1:13 £ 1030 under
parameterization (1)). Parameterization (2) considers a 10% change in ± relative to the
benchmark with all other parameters unchanged, parameterization (3) and (4) consider a
1% change in ® and ½ respectively, and parameterization (5) and (6) consider a 10% change
in ¾ and ¸0 respectively. The results indicate that the ¯ve moments we choose are sensitive
to changes in the parameters. In particular, the investment rate (I=K) is very sensitive
to changes in ±, the cross sectional average and standard deviation of investment rates are
sensitive to changes in all parameters, the autocorrelation of investment rates is sensitive to
changes in ® and ½, and the external ¯nance ratio is very sensitive to changes in ®, ½, ¾ and
increases in ¸0. So we conclude that these moments provide identi¯cation of the parameters
to be estimated.
(Insert Table 2 here.)
Here is a brief description of the estimation procedure. A more detailed description is
given in Appendix A.3. For arbitrary values of the parameters to be estimated, the produc-
tivity shock is approximated by a 10-state Markov chain and the ¯rm's problem is solved by
value function iteration to obtain the decision rules k0(k;z). Using the decision rules, an in-
variant distribution of ¯rms over capital stock and productivity types, ¹(k;z), is computed,
which is independent of the initial distribution of (k;z). Then we draw 20,000 ¯rms from
the invariant ¯rm distribution and carry out the simulation for 15 periods (Our data sample
covers 15 years) to form an arti¯cial panel data set. The ¯ve moments are computed for
this arti¯cial data set and compared with the corresponding data moments. This procedure
is continued until the distance between the moments of the simulated data and the actual
data moments is minimized. Considering the potential discontinuity introduced by the ¯xed
external ¯nance cost and the discretization of the state space, we use a simulated annealing
algorithm as described in Go®e, Ferrier and Rogers (1994) to perform the minimization.
Table 3 summarizes the estimated parameter values and matched moments.
(Insert Table 3 here.)
The high degree of nonlinearities in the solution makes it hard to match all moments
exactly. Nevertheless the approximation appears reasonably close, as shown in Table 3.
Note that the estimated value of ® is 0:8993, which is pretty close to 1, suggesting that the
technology does not substantially depart from constant return to scale. This is consistent to
many of previous studies (See Burnside (1996) and Gomes (2001)). Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) give a much lower ® of about 0.6 using the LRD plant level data. Their estimate
does not contradict ours since Compustat ¯le is composed of bigger and more mature ¯rms
as compared to LRD. The estimated depreciation rate is 0:17, higher than those of most
previous studies based on data before 1990s. Considering the rapid technological progress
since 1990s, a higher depreciation rate of capital seems reasonable. The estimated degree of
persistence and variability in productivity shocks is consistent with Gomes (2001). But the
variability is much smaller than that of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005). The ¯xed cost of
external ¯nance ¸0 is estimated to be about 608, which is about 0.2% of the average size of
external ¯nance in the stationary equilibrium.
104 Results
With the parameters determined, the question outlined in the Introduction can be addressed.
This section summarizes the quantitative impacts of costly external ¯nance on aggregate
productivity, capital accumulation and output. A comparative static analysis is executed to
see how these impacts are a®ected by the primitives of the model. Finally, we brie°y discuss
whether considering a general equilibrium analysis and adding ¯rm entry and exit would
change the results.
4.1 Impact of Costly External Finance on Aggregate Productivity
To evaluate the quantitative impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate productivity, we
compute the output-weighted aggregate productivity and compare it with the productivity
measure we would obtain if external ¯nance is costless, i.e. if all parameter values are
the same as in Table 3 except that ¸0 = 0 and ¸1 = 0. As described in Section 2, to
compute the output-weighted aggregate productivity, a distribution of output shares across
di®erent productivity types is needed. The invariant measure of ¯rms over capital stock
and productivity, ¹(k;z), enables us to do so. As reported in Table 4, the output-weighted
aggregate productivity with costly external ¯nance is 1.0395, while its costless counterpart
is 1.0496. This implies a 1% loss in aggregate productivity due to costly external ¯nance.
According to the NBER manufacturing productivity database, the aggregate TFP growth
for U.S. manufacturing is far less than 1 percent a year and sometimes negative in the 1970s
and 1980s except the period 1982-87 (see Bartelsman and Gray (1996) for details). So our
result suggests that the adverse impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate TFP growth
is quantitatively signi¯cant. Let us examine this result from several aspects by comparing
the two steady state distributions with and without costly external ¯nance.
(Insert Table 4 here.)
First, as illustrated in Figure 2, the productivity distributions with costly or costless
external ¯nance are the same: ¯rms with each of the 10 productivity types account for
10% of all ¯rms. So in Table 4 the average productivity is 1 in both cases. Therefore the
productivity change due to within ¯rm productivity change is zero, i.e., the ¯rst item in the
decomposition of aggregate productivity growth (equation (1)) is zero. So the 1% loss in
output-weighted aggregate productivity due to costly external ¯nance is completely through
the second item{reallocation of output shares. This is shown clearly in Figure 3, which plots
the distribution of output shares across productivity types for the two cases. Note that with
costly external ¯nance, the output shares of ¯rms with high level productivities are smaller
than their costless counterparts, while the output shares of ¯rms with low productivities are
larger than their costless counterparts. It follows that the presence of costly external ¯nance
leads to a shift of output shares from high productivity ¯rms to low productivity ¯rms and
hence results in a lower aggregate productivity. The driving force underlying this result is
the distortion in ¯rms' investment behavior due to costly external ¯nance. As discussed
earlier, the adverse e®ect that costly external ¯nance decreases capital accumulation is more
severe for high productivity ¯rms than for low productivity ¯rms. Consequently, the output
of high productivity ¯rms is more seriously impacted by costly external ¯nance than low
productivity ¯rms and as a result costly external ¯nance leads to a reallocation of output
11shares from high productivity to low productivity ¯rms.
(Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here)
Finally, Figure 4 plots the ¯rm distribution over capital stock in the two cases. If external
¯nance is costless, ¯rms with the same productivity will have the same capital stock, and as a
result the ¯rm distribution is a uniform distribution over the 10 e±cient levels of capital stock
corresponding to the 10 productivity types. While with costly external ¯nance, since ¯rms
are ¯nancially constrained in achieving their e±cient size, the resulting ¯rm distribution is
skewed to the right, with a majority of ¯rms having low capital stock while only a small
fraction of ¯rms having very high capital stock. This feature of the model is consistent with
the data.
(Insert Figure 4 here)
4.2 Impact of Costly External Finance on Output through Real-
location
According to Table 4, costly external ¯nance decreases aggregate output by 6.9 percent.
This is achieved trough two channels. One is the traditional channel{capital accumulation.
As shown in Table 4, costly external ¯nance decreases aggregate capital accumulation by
7.3 percent. Notice that these results hinge on a partial equilibrium analysis. That is, we
keep the price of capital unchanged, p = 1, when solving the costless problem. In a general
equilibrium setting, the price of capital goods would increase to discourage investment as
investment demand rises. As a result, the aggregate capital accumulation and aggregate
output with costless external ¯nance would not be as large as reported in Table 4. So the
adverse e®ects of costly external ¯nance on aggregate capital accumulation and output in a
general equilibrium analysis would be smaller than suggested by Table 4. Here, our focus
is on the impact of costly external ¯nance on output through the second channel{resource
misallocation which results in lower aggregate productivity.
To quantify this impact, we do another experiment. When solving the costless problem,
we vary the price of capital good p, such that aggregate capital stock is the same as its
counterpart with costly external ¯nance. In this way, we keep the aggregate capital accu-
mulation the same in both cases. Any change in aggregate output is completely through
changes in aggregate productivity. The result is summarized in Table 5. Note that the
impact on output-weighted aggregate productivity is not a®ected by the change of capital
price, suggesting that the former result regarding the quantitative impact of costly external
¯nance on aggregate productivity does not hinge on the partial equilibrium analysis adopted.
This property will be explored further in a later discussion. Table 5 shows that a 1 percent
decrease in aggregate productivity due to costly external ¯nance leads to about 0:3 percent
decrease in aggregate output, which seems a small e®ect on aggregate output.
(Insert Table 5 here)
A large literature that attempts to explore the relationship between ¯nancial market
frictions and output growth adopts the framework of neoclassical growth models that ab-
stracts from heterogeneity in production units. Therefore much of this literature has been
concerned with understanding the role of aggregate accumulation and how aggregate accu-
mulation is a®ected by ¯nancial frictions. The role of reallocation is completely neglected.
12With heterogeneous ¯rms, the model can characterize both roles of aggregate accumulation
and reallocation, where the role of reallocation is characterized by the change in output-
weighted aggregate productivity. The quantitative analysis above suggests that the impact
of costly external ¯nance on aggregate output through reallocation is not quite signi¯cant,
despite that a thorough evaluation of the relative importance of aggregate accumulation and
reallocation requires a general equilibrium analysis.
4.3 Comparative Statics
The previous results are based on the baseline calibration. In this section, we execute a
comparative static analysis to see how the e®ects of external ¯nance vary with key parameters
of the model. We consider the e®ects of changes in the return to scale, in the persistence
and variability of the productivity shocks, and in the external ¯nance costs. For each new
parameterization, the ¯rm's problem is re-solved and the model is simulated to generate the
four moments: cross-sectional mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation of investment
rates, and fraction of total investment ¯nanced externally 8. The corresponding problem with
costless external ¯nance is also re-solved to compute the ratios of aggregate productivity,
aggregate capital stock and aggregate output to their costless counterparts. Smaller ratios
imply more severe adverse e®ects of costly external ¯nance. Table 6 summarizes the results.
The middle column of each panel refers to the baseline calibration.
(Insert Table 6 here)
The ¯rst panel of Table 6 shows that the adverse e®ects of costly external ¯nance on
aggregate productivity, aggregate capital accumulation and output increase with the return
to scale parameter, ®. Notice from the table that as ® increases, the average investment
rate and the standard deviation of investment rates both increase, implying that more ¯rms
are likely to resort to external funds to ¯nance their investment needs. This is re°ected in
the higher external ¯nance ratio as ® increases. As a result, costly external ¯nance imposes
more severe adverse impacts on the economy. Since ® indicates market power, as pointed out
in Cooper and Ejarque (2001), this result implies that the adverse e®ects of costly external
¯nance are more severe for an economy where there are more competition among ¯rms (®
is closer to 1).
The second panel shows that the adverse e®ects of costly external ¯nance increase with
the variability in idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Higher ¾ implies greater heterogeneity
among ¯rms. This result suggests that the more diversi¯ed the productions units are, the
greater the loss in aggregate productivity and output through resource misallocation due to
costly external ¯nance. Considering that some studies based on more comprehensive data
set for the U.S. manufacturing give a higher estimate for ¾ (for example, ¾ = :64 in Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006), which uses LRD.), our quantitative result may underestimate the
impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate productivity and output. This will be further
discussed in Section 5.
The third panel shows how the impacts of costly external ¯nance change with the persis-
tence of productivity shocks. If the shock process is more persistent (higher ½), the adverse
impacts are more severe. At the ¯rst look, this may seem confusing. But note that the
standard deviation of the productivity shock z is given by ¾ p
1¡½2. For a given ¾, higher ½
13implies higher variability in the productivity shocks. So the results here are consistent with
the comparative statics with respect to ¾.
The last two panels consider how the impacts vary with the external ¯nance costs. Not
surprisingly, either higher ¯xed cost or higher unit cost of external ¯nance leads to more se-
vere adverse e®ects in aggregate productivity, aggregate capital accumulation and aggregate
output. This property may provide another source of underestimation of our quantitative
results, since Compustat is mainly composed of large mature ¯rms, while large mature ¯rms
tend to face lower external ¯nance costs than young small ¯rms.
5 Discussion
The baseline model described in Section 2 is a partial equilibrium model that excludes ¯rm
entry and exit. In this section, we discuss whether our result concerning the quantitative
impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate productivity would change if a general equi-
librium analysis is adopted and if ¯rm entry and exit are considered. In addition, several
sources of underestimation of this result are identi¯ed in the comparative static analysis due
to the nature of the Compustat data used to calibrate the model. A brief discussion is also
given on the robustness of the result to a richer data set.
5.1 Considering A General Equilibrium Analysis
A key element of the partial equilibrium analysis we adopted for simplicity is that the price
of capital is kept unchanged when we solve for the problem with costless external ¯nance.
In a general equilibrium setting, this price (still a constant in a stationary equilibrium)
is determined by equating the demand and supply of capital. So it may di®er across the
two cases, external ¯nance is costly and costless. However, this di®erence does not matter
for our quantitative result. We show this by proving that the output-weighted aggregate
productivity with costless external ¯nance is independent of the price of capital.
If external ¯nance is costless, the stationary equilibrium is characterized by a uniform
distribution over 10 types of ¯rms, each with a ¯xed productivity level and capital stock.




®¡1 = p(1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)): (3)





























14Notice that the output-weighted aggregate TFP does not depend on the price of capital p.
Therefore our results regarding the quantitative impacts of costly external ¯nance on ag-
gregate productivity and output through reallocation do not hinge on the partial equilibrium
analysis undertaken.
5.2 Considering Firm Entry and Exit
The Compustat data set we use to estimate the model does not exhibit a lot of ¯rm entry
and exit, but entry and exit are a common behavior of the U.S. manufacturing industry.
According to Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), on average approximately 4:5% of
¯rms entered the U.S. manufacturing industry every year during the period of 1963 to 1982
and similar percentage of ¯rms exited every year. Empirical studies also ¯nd a signi¯cant
role of entry and exit of production units in accounting for aggregate productivity growth.
This section presents a brief discussion of how the quantitative impact of costly external
¯nance on aggregate productivity would change if adding ¯rm entry and exit to the model.
Rather than doing a comprehensive analysis, we consider some simple cases of ¯rm entry
and exit.
Assume that the ¯rm's exit is exogenous: every period, the ¯rm has a probability of ´
to exit, where ´ = 0:045 9. Upon exit, the ¯rm secures a zero exit value. Now the ¯rm's
problem is given by






0) ¡ ¼(k;z);0g + ¯(1 ¡ ´)Ez0jzV (k
0;z
0): (5)
In the data, there are high-productivity entrants and low-productivity entrants. So we
consider two extreme cases of ¯rm entry to infer the impact of entry and exit. First, as in
Cooley and Quadrini (2001), new entry ¯rms are of the highest productivity, and second,
new entry ¯rms are of the lowest productivity 10. Upon entry, a new ¯rm chooses its initial
capital stock, which is ¯nanced all by external funds, to maximize its expected continuation






0) ¡ ¸0 ¡ p(1 + ¸1)k0; (6)
where z0 = ¹ z for the ¯rst case, and z0 = z for the second case. Free entry condition implies
that
V0(z0;p) = ce; (7)
where ce is a ¯xed entry cost.
Then for each case, we re-calibrate the model following the same procedure as discussed
in Section 3, i.e., we re-estimate parameters ±, ®, ½, ¾ and ¸0 to match the ¯ve data moments
as described in Section 3 using simulated annealing algorithm. In each case, ce is chosen such
that the free entry condition (7) is satis¯ed. To solve the corresponding costless problem,
we let ¸0 = ¸1 = 0 in problem (5) and (6), and choose the price of capital good, pc such
that (7) is satis¯ed. The new parameter estimates, matched moments, and productivity
15measures for the two cases are reported in Table 7. Note that the matched moments in both
cases are reasonably close to the data moments in Table 3, except the standard deviation
of investment rates in Case 1 11. The results here show that the ratio of output-weighted
aggregate productivity to its costless counterpart is 0.9982 if new ¯rms are of the highest
productivity, and 0.9922 if new ¯rms are of the lowest productivity. In both cases, the loss in
output-weighted aggregate productivity due to costly external ¯nance is less than 1 percent.
One may argue that the re-calibration here is not very appropriate since a model that
considers ¯rm entry and exit should be calibrated to a richer data set that exhibits a lot
of ¯rm entry and exit. For a robustness check, we also consider a crude calibration of the
model to LRD. Of course, due to the lack of access to LRD and the lack of ¯nancial data in
LRD, we are not able to compute the exact moments of LRD that we need for calibration.
So we use the moments of plant level investment rates reported in Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) (LRD, 1972-88, mean: 12.2%, standard deviation: 33.7%, autocorrelation: 5.8%)
as the moments of ¯rm level investment rates, and the fraction of external funds in the
sources of funds reported in Fazarri, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) (U.S. manufacturing,
1970-84, 28.9%) as the external ¯nance ratio. Note that values of these moments are quite
di®erent from what we use in the previous calibrations. In particular, standard deviation of
investment rates and external ¯nance ratio are much higher, which is probably true for LRD
¯rms as compared to the Compustat ¯rms. We let ± = 0:1, ¯ and ¸1 be the same as before,
and estimate ®, ½, ¾ and ¸0 to match the four moments. Table 8 reports the results under
the new calibration. As expected, the loss in aggregate productivity due to costly external
¯nance is larger than reported in Table 7, but it's clear that the magnitude is comparable
with what we get from the baseline model.
These results suggest that we may safely conclude that adding ¯rm entry and exit is
unlikely to change the magnitude of the impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate
productivity dramatically.
5.3 Robustness of the Result to a Richer Data Set
The comparative static results described in Section 4.3 suggest that the adverse impact of
costly external ¯nance increase with the variability of productivity across ¯rms and external
¯nance costs. Since the Compustat data we use to calibrate the model excludes non-publicly
traded manufacturing ¯rms, it may exhibit less variability in ¯rm level TFPs. On the other
hand, compared with the Compustat ¯rms, these non-publicly traded ¯rms tend to face
higher external ¯nance costs since they are typically younger and smaller. Consequently, our
results may underestimate the quantitiative impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate
productivity and aggregate output through reallocation. A recalibration of the model to
a richer data set like LRD for the U.S. manufacturing would be desirable. However, as
discussed in the Introduction, the LRD lacks important ¯nancial information that is crucial
to calibrate the model, which restricts a rigorous recalibration to check the robusteness of our
results. Several other existing databases for the U.S. manufacturing such as small business
database (SBDB) are less representative than the Compustat data ¯le.
However, we argue that the result would not change dramatically if we are able to re-
calibrate the model to a richer data set incorporating ¯nance and performance information.
First, the aggregate productivity measure we consider is output-weighted aggregate produc-
16tivity. The Compustat ¯rms in our data sample account for 82% of the total employment
of the U.S. manufacturing during the sample period. Their output share in the total output
of the U.S. manufacturing must be of a comparable magnitude. This implies a small output
share for the non-publicly traded ¯rms. As a result, the contribution of those non-publicly
traded ¯rms to output-weighted aggregate productivity is small. Second, the results from the
crude calibration of the model with entry and exit to LRD show that although the moments
and parameter estimates are quite di®erent from those obtained in the baseline model, the
quantitative magnitude of the impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate productivity is
comparable. This also gives us con¯dence about the robustness of the quantitative results.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the quantitative impact of costly external ¯nance on aggregate produc-
tivity by incorporating an external ¯nance cost function into a ¯rm's capital accumulation
problem with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Our main result is that costly external
¯nance leads to a reallocation of output shares from high productivity ¯rms to low produc-
tivity ¯rms such that the output-weighted aggregate productivity is 1 percent smaller than
it would be if external ¯nance is not costly. This constitutes a signi¯cant loss to aggregate
productivity. We show that this result does not hinge on the partial equilibrium analysis
undertaken, and considering ¯rm entry and exit is unlikely to change the results signi¯cantly.
A consequence of this reduced aggregate productivity is that it decreases aggregate output
by 0.3 percent. This is an indirect impact of costly external ¯nance, in addition to the direct
impact through reducing aggregate capital accumulation.
We abstract from entry and exit in the main analysis. As entry and exit plays an impor-
tant role in aggregate productivity growth, an interesting extension of the paper is to model
how costly external ¯nance a®ects ¯rms' entry and exit decisions and quantitatively evalu-
ate this impact on aggregate productivity. In addition, we adopt a homogeneous external
¯nance cost function and a stationary analysis. There is empirical evidence suggesting that
¯rms di®er in external ¯nance costs along a lot of dimensions, such as ¯rm size, age, credit
worthiness, and etc. It's not clear whether such heterogeneity matters a lot for the question
outlined here. These questions are open for future research.
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1. Petrin and Levinsohn (2004) argue that the popular measurement of industry produc-
tivity growth adds a \reallocation" term to the growth accounting measure and fails to
use the correct weights in the aggregation such that they call into question the litera-
ture's interpretation of \reallocation" as productivity growth. Instead, they propose a
new method for separating real productivity growth from reallocation e®ects and ¯nd
that such reallocation e®ects are reasonably stable within industries and almost always
positively impact aggregate productivity growth.
2. The Compustat data records the year a ¯rm is deleted from the ¯le and the reason for
deletion. Among the reasons for deletion, bankruptcy and liquidation are regarded as
closely related to ¯rm exit from operation. During the period 1989 to 2003, which is
the sample period of the data set we use to calibrate the model, ¯rm deletion rate due
to bankruptcy and liquidation is about 0.5%.
3. Currently, the Center for Economic Studies of the Bureau of the Census is linking the
LRD to many other data sets, including public ¯nancial databases.
4. The pro¯t function can be regarded as a reduced form that has optimized out inputs
other than capital, as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
5. There is belief that the high external ¯nance ratios for small ¯rms as shown in Table
1 are due to the fact that a lot of small ¯rms in Compustat are young high-tech ¯rms
which are recently publicly listed and have very high equity ¯nancing. Since ¯rm age
information is not available in Compustat, we are not able to re-examine this rela-
tionship by controlling for ¯rm age. But we re-calculate the external ¯nance ratios
by asset class for each of the 20 manufacturing industries and ¯nd that the negative
relationship between external ¯nance ratio and ¯rm asset size holds for most industries
and is particularly remarkable for some high-tech industries such as Chemicals & Al-
lied Products (SIC code 2800), Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer
Equipment (SIC code 3500), Electric and Electronic Equipment and Exchange Com-
ponents (SIC code 3600), Measurement Instrument, Photo Goods and Watches (SIC
code 3800). When we exclude these industries from the data sample, the negative re-
lationship between ¯rm size and external ¯nance ratio still holds but is less remarkable
than shown in Table 1.
6. For our data sample, equity ¯nance is about 10% of total external ¯nance.
7. Data on total expenses of external ¯nance is not available in Compustat. Otherwise,
the cost function of external ¯nance could be directly estimated.
8. Aggregate investment rate is mainly determined by the depreciation rate of capital. It
is about 0.17 in all these scenarios and hence is skipped in Table 6.
189. There is evidence that ¯rm exits are related to low productivity, and also impacted by
external ¯nancing issues. Some recent literature on ¯rm dynamics has explicitly mod-
eled these links, see Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2006) for examples. Modeling these issues here is beyond the scope of the paper.
Instead we assume exogenous ¯rm exit.
10. A more realistic way to model ¯rm entry is to let new ¯rms' productivity follow some
distribution. We avoided this complication because results from the two simple extreme
cases would somehow provide a range for the quantitative impact of external ¯nance
on aggregate productivity with ¯rm entry and exit (exogenous ¯rm exit and new entry
¯rms' productivities ranging from the lowest level to the highest level), and in our view
this is su±cient for us to get some insights on the sensitivity of the results to ¯rm entry
and exit.
11. The estimation routine ¯nds that there is a tension in the two moments: standard
deviation of investment rates and external ¯nance ratio. Since we put more emphasis
on external ¯nance ratio, as we do for the baseline model, the estimation yields a low
standard deviation of investment rates than in the data.
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21Tables and Figures
Table 1. External Finance Ratio by Asset Class, Compustat Manufacturing Firms,
1989-2003
external funds a/ external funds/
sources of funds uses of funds
All ¯rms 0.1077 0.1123
< $250 million 0.9337 0.9660
$250 million - $ 1 billion 0.2593 0.2974
$ 1-2 billion 0.1691 0.1844
> $ 2 billion 0.0784 0.0800
a: For de¯nitions of external funds and sources and uses of funds, see Appendix A.1.2.
22Table 2. Identi¯cation of parameters
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
± 0.1 0.11 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
® 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.986 0.966 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
½ 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
¾ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.009 0.01 0.01
¸0 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1100 900
Moments
I=K 0.1004 0.1106 0.0906 0.1020 0.1007 0.1008 0.1008 0.1006 0.1005 0.1002 0.1009
Avg b. of i=k 0.1118 0.1223 0.1010 0.1365 0.1079 0.1143 0.1106 0.1149 0.1094 0.1032 0.1117
Std c. of i=k 0.1396 0.1419 0.1342 0.2982 0.1113 0.1563 0.1280 0.1606 0.1248 0.0725 0.1391
Corr d. of i=k 0.1320 0.1351 0.1359 0.0917 0.1380 0.1304 0.1353 0.1361 0.1329 0.1275 0.1350
Ext¯n e=I 0.0491 0.0492 0.0471 0.1401 0.0195 0.0692 0.0360 0.0743 0.0323 0.0155 0.0493
b: Average; c: Standard deviation; d: Autocorrelation; e: External ¯nance.
23Table 3. Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value
Price of capital p 1
Discount factor ¯ 0.95
Returns to scale ® 0.8993
Depreciation rate ± 0.17
Persistence of shock ½ 0.8767
Variability of shock ¾ 0.0393
Fixed cost of external ¯nance ¸0 608.4139
Unit cost of external ¯nance ¸1 0.028
Matched Moments Data Model
I=K 0.17 0.1703
Avg. of i=k 0.22 0.1868
Std. of i=k 0.19 0.1784
Corr. of i=k 0.21 0.1632
Ext¯n. =I 0.072 0.0724
24Table 4. Quantitative Impacts of Costly External Finance on Aggregate Productivity,
Capital Accumulation and Output
costly costless ratio
ext. ¯nance ext. ¯nance (costly/costless)
Average productivity 1 1 1
Output-weighted productivity 1.0395 1.0496 0.9904
Aggregate capital stock f 1:2290 ¢ 106 1:3255 ¢ 106 0.9272
Aggregate output 3:0562 ¢ 105 3:2814 ¢ 105 0.9314
f: The aggregates are based on a unit measure of ¯rms in both cases.
25Table 5. Quantitative Impacts of Costly External Finance on Aggregate Productivity and
Output
costly costless ratio
ext. ¯nance ext. ¯nance (costly/costless)
Price of capital good 1 1.0076 0.9925
Average productivity 1 1 1
Output-weighted productivity 1.0395 1.0496 0.9904
Aggregate output 3:0562 ¢ 105 3:0657 ¢ 105 0.9969
26Table 6. Comparative Statics
® = 0:85 ® = 0:8993 ® = 0:95
Average investment rate: 0.1787 0.1868 0.2377
Std. of investment rate: 0.1214 0.1784 0.4317
Autocorrelation of inv. rate: 0.1177 0.1632 0.1217
External ¯nance ratio: 0 0.0724 0.2849
Aggregate capital stock g 0.9678 0.9272 0.736
Aggregate output 0.9706 0.9314 0.7429
Aggregate productivity 0.9938 0.9904 0.9838
¾ = 0:03 ¾ = 0:0393 ¾ = 0:05
Average investment rate: 0.1796 0.1868 0.2015
Std. of investment rate: 0.1294 0.1784 0.2597
Autocorrelation of inv. rate: 0.1469 0.1632 0.1400
External ¯nance ratio: 0.0217 0.0724 0.1623
Aggregate capital stock 0.9559 0.9272 0.8972
Aggregate output 0.9582 0.9314 0.9034
Aggregate productivity 0.9937 0.9904 0.9878
½ = 0:84 ½ = 0:8767 ½ = 0:9
Average investment rate: 0.1833 0.1868 0.1906
Std. of investment rate: 0.1553 0.1784 0.2011
Autocorrelation of inv. rate: 0.1482 0.1632 0.1581
External ¯nance ratio: 0.0480 0.0724 0.0982
Aggregate capital stock 0.9361 0.9272 0.9193
Aggregate output 0.9395 0.9314 0.9243
Aggregate productivity 0.9911 0.9904 0.9901
¸0 = 0 ¸0 = 608:4139 ¸0 = 1000
Average investment rate: 0.1875 0.1868 0.1868
Std. of investment rate: 0.1790 0.1784 0.1795
Autocorrelation of inv. rate: 0.1757 0.1632 0.1528
External ¯nance ratio: 0.0809 0.0724 0.0717
Aggregate capital stock 0.9273 0.9272 0.9264
Aggregate output 0.9315 0.9314 0.9305
Aggregate productivity 0.9907 0.9904 0.9903
¸1 = 0:02 ¸1 = 0:028 ¸1 = 0:035
Average investment rate: 0.1906 0.1868 0.1845
Std. of investment rate: 0.2052 0.1784 0.1629
Autocorrelation of inv. rate: 0.1378 0.1632 0.1598
External ¯nance ratio: 0.1126 0.0724 0.0510
Aggregate capital stock 0.9346 0.9272 0.9237
Aggregate output 0.9388 0.9314 0.9277
Aggregate productivity 0.9923 0.9904 0.9891
g: Figures in the second part of each panel are ratios to their costless counterparts.
27Table 7. Aggregate Productivity and Moments with Firm Entry and Exit
Case 1: new ¯rms are of Case 2: new ¯rms are of
the highest productivity the lowest productivity
Output weighted productivity 1.0031 1.0096








Aggregate investment rate 0.1698 0.1703
Average investment rate 0.1972 0.2247
Std. of investment rate 0.0909 0.1732
Autocorrelation of inv. rate 0.1253 0.1912
External ¯nance ratio 0.1299 0.0718
28Table 8. Aggregate Productivity and Moments with Firm Entry and Exit (a crude
calibration to LRD)
Case 1 Case 2
Output weighted productivity 1.0992 1.0396








Aggregate investment rate 0.0998 0.1004
Average investment rate 0.1114 0.1678 0.122
Std. of investment rate 0.1878 0.3036 0.337
Autocorrelation of inv. rate 0.0588 0.0791 0.058
External ¯nance ratio 0.2684 0.2833 0.289
29Figure 1. Decision rule for k0(k;z) h


















































h: In the computation, the productivity shock process is approximated with a 10-state
Markov chain. Here, the low productivity refers to the third state, and the high productivity
refers to the 9th state. Similar patterns hold for other choices of productivity levels.
30Figure 2. Firm Distribution over Productivity Types




















31Figure 3. Distribution of Output Shares over Productivity Types

























32Figure 4. Firm Distribution over Capital Stock


































A.1.1 Rule for deleting major capital changes
We exclude observations for which
jGki;t ¡ Gki;t¡1 ¡ ii;t + Retri;tj > 0:15 ¢ Gki;t¡1;
where GKi;t denotes book value of gross plant, property and equipment (DATA7), and Retri;t
denotes retirements (DATA184). In the instances where the retirement number is missing,
we assume it is zero unless the discrepancy was negative. In this case, a value of 0:1¢Gki;t¡1
is substituted for Retri;t.
A.1.2 Variables
² Investment: reported capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment (DATA30).
² Gross PPE: book value of gross plant, property and equipment (DATA7).
² Depreciation: reported value of depreciation and amortization (DATA14).
² External ¯nance: sum of net debt issuance, net equity issuance and net changes in
current debt (DATA313+DATA127).
² Sources of funds: sum of operating net cash °ow and net cash °ow from ¯nancing
activities (DATA308+DATA313).
² Uses of funds: sum of capital expenditures, acquisitions and increases in ¯nancial assets
(-DATA311).
² Debt: sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities (DATA9+DATA34).
² Interest expenses on total debt (DATA15).
A.1.3 Procedure for Constructing Investment Rates
A major work for constructing investment rates for each ¯rm at each year involves converting
the book value of capital stock into its replacement value. Denote ki;t as the replacement
value of ¯rm i's capital stock at the beginning of period t (or at the end of period t¡1). It is
constructed by the perpetual inventory method described in Salinger and Summers (1983).
² First, set the replacement value of the initial capital stock equal to the book value of
gross PPE for the ¯rst year the ¯rm appears on Compustat ¯le if it is later than 1979
or for year 1979 otherwise (using years earlier than 1979 as the base year does not
change the results signi¯cantly), i.e., ki;0 = Gki;0, where Gki;t is the reported value of
gross PPE at the end of period t.
34² Then estimate the useful life of capital goods in any year using the formula Li;t =
Gki;t¡1+ii;t
Depri;t , where Depri;t is the reported value of depreciation and amortization. Take
the time average of Li;t, denoted by Li.











(1 ¡ 2=Li);t = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;
where P k
t is the de°ator for non-residential investment, which can be downloaded from
the BEA website.
In calculating the cross sectional mean, standard deviation and autocorrelation of investment
rates, observations with investment rates over 300% are excluded.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To characterize k0(k;z), we rewrite the problem (2) as
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The ¯rm can choose to use external ¯nance or not. The ¯rst inner maximization problem
is the decision of the ¯rm if external funds are needed to ¯nance the investment, and the
second inner maximization problem is the decision if investment can be fully ¯nanced by the




0) = p(1 + ¸1); if k




Note that for given z, (9) determines a unique k0, denoted by k0
e(z). Equating k0
e(z) =
(1 ¡ ±)k +
¼(k;z)
p gives a unique k, denoted by k1(z). Then if k < k1(z), k0(k;z) = k0
e(z).
The ¯rst order condition for the second inner maximization problem is
¯Ez0jzV1(k
0;z
0) = p; if k









Note that there is a unique k0 satisfying ¯Ez0jzV1(k0;z0) = p, which is the unconstrained level,
denoted by k0
u(z). Since ¸1 > 0 and V (k;z) is concave in k, k0
u(z) > k0
e(z). Let k = k2(z)
satisfy k0
u(z) = (1 ¡ ±)k +
¼(k;z)
p . Then k2(z) > k1(z). For k > k2(z), k0(k;z) = k0
u(z). For
k1(z) · k · k2(z), k0(k;z) = (1 ¡ ±)k +
¼(k;z)
p .
Note that the policy function k0(k;z) may be discontinuous at the cuto® point k1(z) due
to the presence of a ¯xed external ¯nance cost.
35A.3 Estimation Procedure
The basic idea of the estimation routine is to choose values of £ ´ (®;±;½;¾;¸0) to match















where ªd denotes the vector of data moments, ªs(£) denotes the moments implied by the
model for given £, W is a weighting matrix. For simplicity, we didn't use the optimal
weighting matrix, instead we specify W as a diagonal matrix, with equal weights to aggre-
gate investment rate, average investment rate, standard deviation of investment rates and
autocorrelation of investment rates, while a higher weight to external ¯nance ratio (Since
our focus is on the quantitative impact of costly external ¯nance, we put more emphasis on
this moment condition).
Simulated annealing algorithm, as described in Go®e, Ferrier and Rogers (1994), is ap-
plied to perform the optimization. For arbitrary values of model parameters £, the model
moments ªs(£) is computed as follows.
1. Solve the ¯rm's problem by value function iteration:
(a) Approximate the productivity shock process by a 10-state Markov chain, as de-
scribed in Tauchen (1986);
(b) Let the state space for k be [10¡6;¹ k0], where ¹ k0 is the steady state capital stock
in a deterministic problem with productivity being the highest level. Discretize
[10¡6;¹ k0] into 301 equally spaced points, and do value function iteration until
convergence is obtained;
(c) Re¯ne the state space for k as [k;¹ k], where k = min(k;z) k0(k;z), ¹ k = max(k;z) k0(k;z),
and k0(k;z) is the policy function obtained in (b). Discretize [k;¹ k] into 801 equally
spaced points, take the value function obtained in (b) as the initial value function,
and do value function iteration until convergence.
2. Starting from a uniform distribution over (k;z) and using the decision rule k0(k;z) ob-
tained in 1(c), do another function iteration to obtain the stationary ¯rm distribution,
¹(k;z);
3. Generate 20,000 ¯rms from the stationary ¯rm distribution and carry out the simula-
tion for 15 periods, compute the moments using the simulated panel data set.
The resulted model moments are used to compute the weighted distance from the data
moments. If the termination criteria is not met, £ is updated by the simulated annealing
algorithm, and steps 1 to 3 are repeated. This process continues until the stopping criteria
is met.
The algorithm is written in Matlab (The program can be made available to readers on
request). The number of updates of £ is 400 times and the resulted weighted distance is
0.0035. The computer we use is Intel(R) Xeon (TM), double cpu 2.80GHz and 2.79GHz,
1.00GB of RAM. The estimation routine takes roughly 60 hours.
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